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GENERAL

S/1998/630
10 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the letter by Mr. Alem Razm, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, dated 9 July 1998, which is addressed to you.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. A. G. Ravan FARHÂDI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-20201 (E) 100798

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Annex

Letter dated 9 July 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, I would like to acknowledge your tireless endeavours for bringing peace to war-ravaged Afghanistan.

As articulately stated by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan during his meeting with you in New York on 9 June 1998, my Government attaches great importance to the central role of the United Nations in the peace process in Afghanistan.

Consistent with this, taking a fervent interest in the peace-making activities of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), my Government has studied your report on Afghanistan of 19 June 1998 (A/52/957-S/1998/532). We agree fully with you on many of the elements contained in the report.

However, on the efforts of neighbouring Pakistan presumably aiming to return peace to Afghanistan, the observations by Pakistan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, in an interview in the Egyptian paper Al-Ahram of 30 June 1998, clearly exhibit an inconsistent malicious trend on the part of the military policy in that country towards Afghanistan.

Replying to a question in the above-mentioned interview, the Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs said, "both President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud belong to the Tajik minority, which constitutes 13 per cent of the population in Afghanistan. Mr. Karim Khalili, the leader of the Wahdat party, belongs to the Hazars minority that forms 10 per cent, and General Dostum belongs to the Uzbek minority, which constitutes 7 per cent of Afghanistan's population".

He further maintained that it is a fact that Pakistan, in the event of confronting India, "is in need of a strategic depth". "We always", Mr. Gohar Ayub admitted, "believe that the presence of a friendly Government in Kabul would suffice in providing such a strategic depth for us". He further continued "that two Provinces of Pakistan, which are adjacent to Afghanistan, are populated by the Pashtuns, an ethnic group that is a major one in Pakistan. This fact reveals our responsibilities and priorities in Afghanistan", the Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs, himself an ethnic Pashtun, concluded.

For the sake of the record and to shed light on the misconception by Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan of Pakistan, I should like to take this opportunity to state that his need of inventing erroneous and grotesque statistical data on the composition of ethnic groups or percentages in Afghanistan and also on the percentage of Taliban-held territory stems from hegemonic designs. While his acclaimed notion, widely rejected by experts on Afghanistan alludes to the misconception that the Taliban, in this case the Pashtuns, embody 60 per cent of the entire Afghan population, the reality remains that no ethnic group in

Afghanistan comprises the majority and that no ethnic group in Afghanistan represents more than 37 per cent of the population.

The remarks of the Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, grotesquely elaborate on the ethnic configuration in Afghanistan and, beyond that, present a caricature of the percentages of the actual statistics of the ethnic composition of the country, admittedly aimed at the incitement of racial hegemony and also of racial hatred among the multi-ethnic people of Afghanistan. In fact, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan intends to prove that Pakistan has to bank on the Taliban to transform Afghanistan into a country of "strategic depth" serving Pakistan. The expressions indeed reveal the bitter reality that, in Pakistan today, a genuine State change of policy for peace towards Afghanistan remains a dashed hope for the ruling civilian Government.

Considering the statements by Mr. Ayub Khan irresponsible and menacing, I would like to reiterate that the Islamic State of Afghanistan remains convinced that these statements are not in line with the genuine aspirations of both the Government and of the people of Pakistan.

We firmly believe that exploring ways and means for building confidence and promoting mutual trust between the two fraternal countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan would rightfully serve the legitimate interests of both countries, regional stability and the realization of economic opportunities.

(Signed) Mohammad'Âlem RAZM
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Islamic State of Afghanistan

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A/52/981
S/1998/631
10 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 9 July 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following developments regarding the continuing destruction of the religious and cultural identity of the occupied part of Cyprus.

The policy of the Government of Cyprus is to protect and maintain all cultural, historical and religious monuments in Cyprus. Unfortunately, this policy is not adhered to in the illegally occupied areas controlled by Turkish troops.

The most recent documented violations are the desecration and partial destruction of the Church of the Holy Virgin, which is being used as a potato warehouse, in the village of Makrasyka, and the wanton and callous vandalism of the adjoining cemetery.

Disregarding all tenets of contemporary civilization, violating the fundamental principles of safeguarding and maintaining cultural and religious monuments, as outlined by international law, and systematically proceeding with its policy of changing the demographic character of the occupied area of Cyprus, Turkey, in the 24 years of its illegal occupation, has done more irreparable and wilful damage to the culture of Cyprus than it has ever been subjected to in its long history.

It is time that the indifference of the international community towards the above-mentioned Turkish actions be stopped.

Already over 500 churches have been vandalized, destroyed or looted. These crimes are in violation of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation adopted by the General Conference of the

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It should be reiterated that these acts of destruction are being promoted by Turkey in keeping with its policies and long-term expansionist plans against Cyprus.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotirios ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1998/632
10 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1998 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the draft agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia on the permanent settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka, with an explanatory note (see annexes).

I would appreciate if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-20207 (E) 100798

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Annex I

DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA ON THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTED ISSUE OF PREVLAKA

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: "Contracting Parties");

Committed to the respect and implementation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of good-neighbourly relations, peaceful settlement of disputes and general rules of international law;

Proceeding from the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, signed in Belgrade on 23 August 1996;

Convinced that the achievement of a just and mutually acceptable solution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka will contribute to the promotion of overall Yugoslav-Croatian relations, stability and economic development of the region;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Under the provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, the Contracting Parties shall effect delimitation on land and at sea in the disputed area of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with the general rules of international law on delimitation, proceeding in particular from the effective exercise of jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties on land and at sea, as well as with the principles of equality and good-neighbourly relations.

In order to comply with the commitments referred to in the first paragraph above, a Joint Yugoslav-Croatian Commission shall be established.

Article 2

Aiming to strengthen mutual confidence and good neighbourly relations, the Contracting Parties are agreed that the Prevlaka area will be used solely for peaceful purposes.

The Contracting Parties shall regulate this matter, including the possibility of permanent demilitarization, through specific arrangements in accordance with international law.

Article 3

In order to implement the principles of good-neighbourly relations and promote economic and tourist cooperation, the Contracting Parties are agreed to establish a permanent border-crossing point for international road transport along the Herceg Novi-Sutorina-Dubrovnik motorway, to be regulated by an amendment to the Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on establishing border-crossing points.

Article 4

The Contracting Parties are agreed that a border traffic regime be established for specific counties (opstinas) from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/the Republic of Montenegro and from the territory of the Republic of Croatia, to be regulated by an amendment to the Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on border traffic.

Article 5

This Agreement is done in two original copies, in the Serbian and Croatian languages, both of which are equally authentic.

This Agreement shall be applied from the date of its signature and it shall enter into force after the Contracting Parties have notified each other through diplomatic channels that it has been approved by their respective authorities.

Done in _____on the _____ day of _____

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSLAVIA

FOR THE REPUBLIC
OF CROATIA

Annex II

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has prepared the attached text of the draft agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia on permanent settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka, which was delivered to the Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade on 10 July 1998.

The draft agreement is an expression of a consistent policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to promote overall Yugoslav-Croatian relations, stability and economic development in the region, while respecting and implementing the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of good-neighbourly relations, peaceful settlement of disputes and general rules of international law. The draft agreement is fully in accordance with the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia of 23 August 1996 and it reaffirms, at the same time, the constructive and cooperative attitude of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards Security Council resolutions concerning Prevlaka, including resolution 1147 (1998) of 13 January 1998, urging the two parties to take concrete steps towards a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in good faith and without delay.

From the very beginning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has made great efforts to resolve the disputed issue of Prevlaka by peaceful means. This has been proved, among other things, by the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, in which the Prevlaka area was demilitarized and placed under United Nations control, as well as by many letters and other documents on the subject from the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Security Council. The positions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the issue of Prevlaka have been explained in detail in the aide-mémoire of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia of October 1996 (A/51/563*-S/1996/884*).

Along the lines of these efforts, in pursuance of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, the draft agreement on permanent settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka provides that the Contracting Parties shall effect delimitation, under Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations, on land and at sea in the disputed area of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with the general rules of international law on delimitation, proceeding in particular from the effective exercise of jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties on land and at sea, and from the principles of equality and good-neighbourly relations. Towards that end, a Joint Yugoslav-Croatian Commission shall be established.

Expressing its readiness immediately to start negotiations with the Croatian side, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the proposed draft agreement constitutes a solid basis for a permanent settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka, in which both parties are

interested. Resolution of this issue will make significant contribution to the implementation of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the two countries, the relevant Security Council resolutions and towards the promotion of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation in the region.

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S/1998/633
10 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council took note with appreciation of your report of 10 June 1998 (S/1998/497 and Add.1) concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia.

The members of the Council reiterated their call upon the parties to display the necessary political will to achieve substantial results within the framework of the United Nations-led peace process and through direct dialogue.

The members of the Council supported the practical measures envisaged in this report to strengthen the security of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

The members of the Council reiterated their deep concern regarding the security of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and noted the measures already taken to improve security conditions to minimize the danger to Mission personnel and to create conditions for the implementation of its mandated tasks, while underlining the need to continue to make further arrangements in this field.

In this context, the members of the Council look forward to your report pursuant to resolution 1150 (1998) of 30 January 1998.

(Signed) Sergey V. LAVROV
President of the Security Council

98-20213 (E) 100798

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S/1998/634
10 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1163 (1998) of 17 April 1998 by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 20 July 1998, and requested me to report to it every 30 days on the progress of the implementation of the Settlement Plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1) and the agreements reached between the parties, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, Mr. James A. Baker III (S/1997/742, annexes I to III). The present report covers developments since my previous report to the Council dated 18 June 1998 (S/1998/534).

II. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

2. During the reporting period, my Special Representative, Mr. Charles F. Dunbar, continued his consultations on various issues related to the implementation of the Settlement Plan. He met with the Prime Minister of Morocco, Mr. Abderrahmane Youssoufi, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Mr. Abdellatif Filali, at Rabat on 18 and 19 June 1998, and with the POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, Mr. M'Hamed Khaddad, in the Tindouf area of Algeria on 23 June.

A. Identification process

3. In June 1998, MINURSO identified a total of 13,142 applicants to the referendum. A high level of activity was thus maintained in the identification process, despite interruptions at the sessions held in Mauritania (see para. 6 below). As at 6 July 1998, 104,200 applicants had been convoked for identification since the resumption of the process in December 1997. Of those, 75,555 appeared before the Identification Commission to be interviewed. With the 60,112 applicants who had been identified during the initial phase of the process (August 1994-December 1995), the total number of persons identified thus far comes to 135,667.

4. MINURSO presented both parties with a provisional programme of identification for July and August 1998, which has yet to be finalized. The Identification Commission suspended its operations for the week of 6 to 10 July in observance of local holidays, but identification is still proceeding on schedule. With the full cooperation of both parties, identification of most applicants from tribal groups other than H41, H61 and J51/52 should be completed in August 1998.

5. The Government of Morocco has maintained the position that it will not participate in the identification of those applicants from tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52 who are listed in the 1974 Spanish census and their immediate families, until the overall issue of the identification of all applicants from those three groupings is resolved. Thus, the identification of the 603 applicants concerned could not proceed, since the presence of observers of the two parties is required for the identification sessions to proceed, according to my predecessor's compromise proposal of 1993 on the interpretation and application of the criteria and procedures for establishing the identity of prospective voters (S/26185, annex I).

6. On 25 June, Moroccan observers halted the identification sessions at the Zouerate centre in Mauritania, on the grounds that certain applicants who reported to that centre had changed their place of residence from the refugee camps in the Tindouf area to Mauritania. Yet, as indicated in my letter of 12 December 1997 to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/974), both parties had agreed with MINURSO on 14 November 1997 that changes of address and any other information pertinent to the determination of the appropriate identification centre could be provided by either party. In a letter to the Government of Morocco dated 28 June, the Identification Commission expressed concern regarding this latest development and sought the participation of Moroccan observers attending identification sessions in Mauritania. However, on 1 July, the Government of Morocco reiterated its refusal to allow changes of address between the refugee camps and Mauritania. This action could affect up to 2,000 applicants in Mauritania.

7. In their consultations with my Special Representative, both parties have maintained their former positions with regard to the outstanding issue of the identification of the H41, H61 and J51/52 tribal groupings, including the proposal contained in my report of 15 January 1998 (S/1998/35) that MINURSO complete, as a first step, the identification of the 4,000 individuals who had presented themselves on the days of convocation of members from the above three groupings who are listed in the 1974 census and of their immediate families.

B. Military aspects

8. As at 6 July 1998, the military component of MINURSO stood at 366 observers and other military personnel (see annex), including the demining unit from Sweden and advance elements of the engineering support unit from Pakistan deployed in accordance with Security Council resolution 1148 (1998) of 26 January 1998. Under the command of Major-General Bernd S. Lubenik (Austria), the military component of the Mission continues to monitor the ceasefire which came into effect on 6 September 1991 between the Royal Moroccan Army and the

Frente POLISARIO forces. The MINURSO area of responsibility remains calm, and there have been no indications that either side intends to resume hostilities.

9. The advance party of the military engineering support unit from Pakistan stands at 6 staff officers and 53 military personnel. The advance party has commenced construction of facilities in Laayoune and Smara for the unit's main body and in support of the demining activities. Some elements have been deployed for the planned refurbishment of subsector command facilities located east of the defensive sand-wall ("berm").

10. The demining unit from Sweden stands at 4 staff officers and 73 troops, including the unit's remaining 14 members who deployed to the Mission area on 1 July 1998. The remainder of contingent-owned equipment, excluding weapons and ammunition, arrived in Laayoune on 5 July 1998. During the reporting period, the unit undertook mine assessment studies at 14 of the proposed military construction sites, finalized operational priorities, conducted road reconnaissance for transport planning and continued to mark unexploded ordnance within the Mission area. However, pre-deployment training remains to be completed upon receipt of contingent arms and ammunition. Major initial difficulties regarding preparation, construction and occupation of a logistics complex at a privately owned facility in Laayoune have been resolved, and operations at the site are now proceeding smoothly.

11. In June 1998, the military engineering support and demining units of MINURSO also supported route reconnaissance conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the northern sector. An operational planning session took place between the Mission's military units and UNHCR representatives in the Tindouf area, to refine military support for repatriation and resettlement plans in preparation for the UNHCR workshop to be held in Laayoune later in July 1998.

12. The MINURSO engineering support and demining units will not be fully operational until the arrival of their weapons and ammunition. In this regard, consultations between MINURSO and the Moroccan authorities are expected to be held in the coming days, to work out practical arrangements for the carriage of weapons and custody of equipment and ammunition by those units.

13. The early conclusion of the status-of-forces agreements, the drafts of which were submitted to Morocco on 31 March 1998 and to Algeria and Mauritania on 3 April 1998, would greatly facilitate the full and timely deployment of MINURSO formed military units. On 29 June, the Secretariat received a formal reply from the Government of Algeria, along with several proposed amendments to the draft agreement, and is currently reviewing these proposals. In a formal reply dated 2 July, the Government of Mauritania confirmed its acceptance of the draft agreement, adding some minor comments. The Secretariat expects that the status-of-forces agreements with those two Governments may be signed as soon as possible. In the meantime, the Moroccan authorities have indicated that they were finalizing their response to the draft agreement and would submit it shortly.

C. Civilian police aspects

14. The total number of civilian police officers assigned to MINURSO stands at 80 out of an approved total of 81 (see annex). Under the command of the Civil Police Commissioner, Chief Superintendent Peter Miller (Canada), the civilian police component of MINURSO continues to provide security and assist the Identification Commission at all operating identification centres; it also provides security after working hours for identification materials at the Mission headquarters in Laayoune. The work of the Mission's civilian police in support of the identification operation has been proceeding relatively smoothly and will continue to follow the Identification Commission's schedule.

15. However, preparations by the MINURSO civilian police related to the repatriation of Saharan refugees have been hindered by problems encountered in the conduct of UNHCR activities in the Territory (see para. 16 below) and by difficulties in obtaining relevant information from the Government of Morocco. The Civil Police Commissioner hopes that this situation will be rectified in the near future, so that greater emphasis may be directed towards the planning process for the safe return of refugees eligible to vote and their immediate families.

D. Preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees

16. During the reporting period, UNHCR continued with its preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees, as provided for under the Settlement Plan, albeit at a reduced pace in view of delays expected in the implementation of the Plan as well as for the following reasons: although its discussions in Rabat yielded some positive results, UNHCR still awaits clearance from the Government of Morocco on a number of remaining issues before it can undertake activities in Western Sahara, as planned in its repatriation programme. The formalization of UNHCR's presence in Western Sahara, arrangements to ensure the freedom of access and movement of UNHCR personnel throughout the Territory and the implementation of UNHCR preparatory work, such as confidence-building and infrastructure development, are still pending. With regard to these issues, the Secretariat was informed by the Moroccan authorities on 9 July 1998 that they were prepared to cooperate with UNHCR. Renewed discussions in Rabat with the Ministry of the Interior regarding UNHCR role and activities in Western Sahara, including a joint visit to the Territory, are expected to take place later in July.

17. In view of the above limitations, UNHCR has decided not to launch an appeal for funds, as was indicated in my previous report (S/1998/534). However, UNHCR will continue with its preparatory activities in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria, in northern Mauritania and in the eastern part of the Territory, and the balance of funds currently available would be sufficient for this purpose until the end of 1998. Should conditions change, UNHCR would consider launching an appeal in due course.

18. Pre-registration of refugees continued in northern Mauritania and Algeria. At Zouerate and Nouadhibou in Mauritania, UNHCR has pre-registered 14,000 persons to date and intends to continue this exercise until MINURSO has completed the identification operation in Mauritania. Pre-registration resumed

at the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where 18,000 refugees have been pre-registered thus far. UNHCR continued with other preparatory activities in the Tindouf camps, including water and infrastructure development, information-sharing, assessment of refugee needs and mine awareness. In addition, UNHCR air and road reconnaissance was completed. In the coming days, UNHCR expects to share with MINURSO its logistics planning, including the results of the road reconnaissance, so that safe repatriation routes and sites may be identified as soon as possible.

E. Other aspects

19. On 26 May, the Government of Morocco informed my Special Representative that, in its view, the use of MINURSO aircraft should be limited exclusively to MINURSO personnel, particularly on flights between Laayoune and Tindouf. The airport authorities in Laayoune have since denied access to MINURSO flights to Tindouf to a British correspondent and a Portuguese television crew, as well as to Tindouf and Smara to an Argentine photographer commissioned by his Government to prepare a book on Argentina's role in United Nations peacekeeping operations, including MINURSO.

20. Following attempts to resolve the issue, my Special Representative addressed a letter to the Government of Morocco on 30 June, stressing that visits by diplomats, staff of non-governmental organizations and journalists directly related to the mandate of MINURSO contribute to the conduct of the Mission's activities and to the transparency of the process. While indicating that he would ensure that national requirements for appropriate travel documents, as well as United Nations standard practices were respected, my Special Representative reaffirmed his strong belief that those visitors should be allowed to fly aboard MINURSO aircraft and asked the Government of Morocco to reconsider its position.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

21. As indicated in my report of 16 March 1998 (A/52/730/Add.3 and Corr.2), the proposed budget for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 amounts to $65.1 million gross. Pending my further recommendations on the revised timetable for the implementation of the Settlement Plan, the General Assembly, by its resolution 52/228 B of 26 June 1998, provided an initial bridging appropriation of $21.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $5.4 million gross, for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998.

22. Accordingly, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINURSO to 21 September 1998, as recommended in paragraph 30 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission during the extension period would be limited to the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

23. As at 30 June 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period from inception to 30 June 1998 amounted to $65.6 million.

The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 June 1998 was $1,527.9 million.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

24. The substantial increase in the pace of identification in June and early July will, if sustained, enable MINURSO to complete, during the month of August 1998, the identification of applicants from all Saharan tribes other than tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52. Both Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO have generally cooperated in ensuring that the process moves forward, with the exception of the difficulties described in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. It would be imperative therefore to resolve these difficulties so that the identification of all applicants other than those from groupings H41, H61 and J51/52 may be completed on schedule.

25. As mentioned in my report to the Security Council dated 18 June (S/1998/534), it is important that UNHCR's presence in the Territory be formalized and that substantive consultations between the Moroccan Government and UNHCR be conducted as soon as possible, in order to allow the latter to promote the necessary climate of confidence among the refugees, enabling them to return under conditions of safety and dignity. In this regard, I have taken note with satisfaction that, as indicated in paragraph 16 above, the Moroccan authorities have expressed their readiness to cooperate with UNHCR.

26. Formal replies to the draft status-of-forces agreements have been received from Algeria and Mauritania, and I hope that the agreements with these two Governments may be signed shortly. I also expect that the Moroccan authorities will provide an early positive response, as indicated in paragraph 13 above, so that the status-of-forces agreement may also be concluded with them without further delay.

27. The restrictions imposed on the use of MINURSO aircraft, which are not in line with the practice of United Nations peacekeeping operations, could have a negative public relations impact on the peace process in Western Sahara and could reduce the availability to Security Council members and troop and police contributing nations of useful information related to the Mission.

28. The issue of how to proceed with the identification of members of tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52, other than those included in the 1974 census and their immediate families, is the only major impediment to MINURSO's completing the identification phase and moving on to the final phase of the referendum process. The differences between the two parties in the interpretation of the status accorded to applicants from those three groupings in the Settlement Plan and the Houston agreements remain substantial. My Special Representative has been unable to obtain, from either party, practical suggestions which would allow for reconciliation of their points of view.

29. In my report to the Council of 13 April 1998 (S/1998/316), I indicated that if, by the end of June, sufficient progress had been made in the identification process and in the search for solutions to the contentious issue of tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52, I would submit recommendations for a revised

timetable for the full implementation of the Settlement Plan with this report. In the light of what has transpired, and particularly taking into account the progress made on identifying applicants from tribes other than those three groupings, I have asked that, after substantial completion of the process of identifying all groups other than H41, H61 and J51/52, my Personal Envoy consider engaging the parties in seeking a solution to the problem of identifying those three tribal groupings and to other issues bearing upon the implementation of the Settlement Plan. Thereafter, my Personal Envoy would assess the implementability of the Plan in its present form, examine whether there are any adjustments to the Plan, acceptable to the parties, which would significantly improve the chances of implementing it, and if there are not, advise me on possible avenues to be pursued. Such an assessment would influence my conclusions as to the continued viability of MINURSO's mandate.

30. In order to provide time for the course of action suggested in the preceding paragraph, I recommend that MINURSO's mandate be extended for a period of two months, until 21 September 1998. Accordingly, instead of submitting my next report in mid-August 1998, I intend to submit it by 15 September 1998. If, by then, it appears that there is still a possibility that the Settlement Plan can be implemented, I shall submit a revised timetable along with the report to the Security Council. If, on the other hand, it appears that the Settlement Plan is no longer viable, it will be my intention to include recommendations on the continued viability of MINURSO's mandate in the next report.

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: contributions as at 6 July 1998

	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Civilian police observers	Total
Argentina	1	-	-	-	1
Austria	5	-	-	-	5*
Bangladesh	6	-	-	-	6
Canada	-	-	-	8	8
China	16	-	-	-	16
Egypt	19	-	-	2	21
El Salvador	2	-	-	-	2
France	25	-	-	-	25
Ghana	6	-	7	10	23
Greece	1	-	-	-	1
Guinea	3	-	-	-	3
Honduras	12	-	-	-	12
Ireland	8	-	-	-	8
India	-	-	-	10	10
Italy	5	-	-	-	5
Kenya	8	-	-	-	8
Malaysia	13	-	-	10	23
Nigeria	5	-	-	10	15
Norway	-	-	-	2	2
Pakistan	5	6	53	8	72
Poland	3	-	-	-	3
Portugal	4	-	-	10	14
Republic of Korea	-	-	20	-	20
Russian Federation	25	-	-	-	25
Sweden	-	4	73	10	87**
Uruguay	13	-	-	-	13

	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Civilian police observers	Total
United States of America	15	-	-	-	15
Venezuela	3	-	-	-	3
Total	203	10	153	80	446

* In addition to the Force Commander.

** Including four national support elements (NSE).

Map No. 3691 Rev. 17 UNITED NATIONS
July 1998

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/635
13 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I feel it necessary to draw your attention to the truth of the so-called submarine incident discussed in the letter of the Permanent Representative of south Korea, dated 2 July 1998, and its annexed statement on the "incident" contained in Security Council document S/1998/607.

As has been known, a submarine of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was wrecked after drifting because of mechanical trouble while on a training mission in the East Sea of Korea off the coastal area of Kosong on 22 June 1998.

Shortly after the wreckage, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made it public through the media and appealed for its rescue. The Government took the initiative by proposing the convocation of the General Officers meeting between the Korean People's Army and the International Allied Forces.

At the General Officers meeting on 23 June 1998, our side provided detailed information about the submarine having drifted into the high seas because of mechanical trouble while on a training mission and subsequently wrecked and strongly demanded that the submarine and its crew be returned.

The United States side responded to some of our demands by handing over the remains of the crew on 3 July 1998.

However, the south Korean authorities have brought this case, which was already discussed and resolved at the General Officers Talk, to the United Nations. This act on the part of south Korea was motivated by nothing but indecent political purposes.

The south Korean side claims that the submarine infiltrated their territorial waters. But, according to our investigation, the submarine was in the high seas, 12.7 miles offshore, when it got wrecked.

The south Korean side also alleges that the submarine was engaged in "espionage" by presenting outfits and weapons made in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from inside the submarine as "evidence".

However, those outfits and weapons themselves indicate that the submarine was on a training mission.

If the submarine were really on an "espionage" mission, as alleged by south Korea, it would have been equipped with outfits and weapons made by either south Korea or the United States.

The south Korean authorities can not avoid their responsibility for not rescuing the wrecked submarine, in violation of international law, and should return the submarine immediately.

I would appreciate if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LI Hyong Chol
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/52/982
S/1998/636
13 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 10 July 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 10 July 1998, addressed to you by Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-20444 (E) 140798

/...

Annex

Letter dated 10 July 1998 from Mr. Avtuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 23 June 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations, which contains allegations levelled against the Turkish Cypriot side in an attempt to disguise the ongoing heavy militarization campaign in South Cyprus (A/52/965-S/1998/559).

At the outset, I wish to underline that the Cyprus question arose in 1963, when the Greek Cypriot wing of the bi-national Republic of Cyprus, established under international treaties in 1960, attempted to impose its political will on the Turkish Cypriot partner by force of arms. In the process, the Greek Cypriots usurped the title of the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" but have not been able to impose their political will on the Turkish Cypriot people. As a result of the Greek Cypriot onslaught in December 1963, Turkish Cypriots were forcefully ejected from all State organs and subjected to brute force, oppression and discrimination. Hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands rendered homeless refugees. The Turkish Cypriots did not bow to this attempted takeover of the bi-national partnership State and, through its national resistance, prevented the Greek Cypriot side from extending its illegal writ over the Turkish Cypriot side. The crux of the Cyprus question is precisely this continuing attempt by the Greek Cypriot side to do so.

The Greek Cypriot representative, in a vain attempt to absolve his side from the responsibility of creating and perpetuating the Cyprus dispute, once again refers to the legitimate presence of a guarantor power in Northern Cyprus as an "illegal occupation". I wish to reiterate that the only illegal occupation in Cyprus is the 35-year-old usurpation and occupation by the Greek Cypriot side of the seat of Government of the once bi-national Republic of Cyprus.

Turkey intervened on the island following the coup d'état engineered by Greece in 1974, which constituted a blatant attempt by Greece to annex the island (enosis) and was described even by the Greek Cypriot side's own leader, Archbishop Makarios, in his speech before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, as "an invasion" by Greece. One should also recall that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was carried out against the background of an 11-year-old systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing directed against the Turkish Cypriot people by the Greek Cypriot side, acting in collusion with Greece. Hence, the necessity to dispatch a United Nations peacekeeping force (the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) to the island in early 1964.

It hardly needs to be stressed that Turkey's presence on the island, which emanates from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, is a vital security requirement for the Turkish Cypriots, as it serves as a deterrent against the repetition of Greek-Greek Cypriot aggression. In the face of the unprecedented build-up of arms and armed forces by the Greek Cypriot administration and the implementation of the "joint military doctrine" with Greece, the necessity of maintaining the Turkish deterrent becomes all the more obvious. It should be noted that the

Greek Cypriot administration still wages a war of attrition against Northern Cyprus, subjecting the Turkish Cypriots to an all-embracing inhuman embargo.

For some time now we have been conveying to you the views and concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side over the implementation of the "joint military doctrine" between the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece and, in this context, pointing to the dangers posed by the planned deployment of the S-300 missiles, the construction of military air and naval bases for use by Greece and the possible deployment of Greek combat aircraft in the said airbase in Paphos. It will be recalled on 16 June 1998 the Greek Cypriot administration brought the already tense situation on the island to the point of a crisis by allowing the landing of Greek military aircraft at the Paphos military airbase in south Cyprus. This is the first time that Greek military aircraft have been deployed in south Cyprus outside of a military exercise and constitutes a grave threat to the stability in the island and the region.

The provocative remarks made by the President of Greece, Mr. Constantinos Stephanopoulos, during his four-day official visit to South Cyprus from 25 to 28 June 1998, to the effect that "Cyprus itself is Greece" and "It is not Greece which is claiming that Cyprus is part of Hellenism; history clearly tells us it is" (Greek Cypriot press of 26 and 27 June 1998) sheds light on the true political and military objectives of the Greek-Greek Cypriot front. Mr. Stephanopoulos made no secret of the joint efforts to achieve further "qualitative improvements" in the "joint military doctrine" being implemented between the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece (Greek Cypriot daily Cyprus Mail of 26 June 1998).

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot press reported that the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister, Mr. Yannakis Omirou, has travelled to the Russian Federation on a four-day visit to witness the test-launching of S-300 missiles by Greek Cypriot army officers. The Greek Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Weekly of 10 July 1998 reports that the test took place on 9 July 1998 at a firing range 1,200 kilometres south of Moscow and was observed by a Greek Cypriot delegation, including Mr. Omirou and the Greek Cypriot National Guard Commander Demetris Demou.

In view of the foregoing, the so-called demilitarization proposals made by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, are indicative of the Greek Cypriot side's insincerity and hypocrisy about the security aspect of the Cyprus dispute. Demilitarization of Cyprus has never been on the agenda of the United Nations as a subject to be discussed and agreed to during the negotiating process, but as an ultimate objective to be taken up by the parties after an overall settlement. The relevant paragraph of the United Nations "set of ideas" states that "the demilitarization of the federal republic remains an objective" (para. 53). In any case, the attempt by the Greek Cypriot side to use the S-300 missile system as a bargaining chip is futile. If Mr. Clerides is genuinely interested in the security aspect of the Cyprus dispute, he should first accept the implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus package of military measures for reducing tension along the border, as called for in successive Security Council resolutions on Cyprus.

The repeated allegations made by the Greek Cypriot administration demonstrate that it is not prepared to acknowledge the present reality of the existence of two separate States which will constitute the framework of a new partnership based on the sovereign equality of the two sides in Cyprus. Instead, the Greek Cypriot administration persists in a strategy of distorting the nature of the Cyprus dispute and creating further tension through militarization. These efforts, needless to say, are counter-productive and clearly do not contribute to the search for an overall settlement in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/52/982*
S/1998/636*
17 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 10 July 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 10 July 1998, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

Letter dated 10 July 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

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I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/637
14 July 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997, 1136 (1997) of 6 November 1997, 1152 (1998) of 5 February 1998, 1155 (1998) of 16 March 1998, and 1159 (1998) of 27 March 1998,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 19 June 1998 (S/1998/540) and noting the recommendations contained therein,

Noting with satisfaction the rapid and effective deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA),

Stressing the importance of regional stability and the need to consolidate the progress achieved so far, and in particular to assist the people of the Central African Republic to consolidate the process of national reconciliation and to help sustain a secure and stable environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections,

Welcoming the inauguration of the Electoral Commission with a neutral and independent Chairman and stressing the need for all signatories to the Bangui Agreements to cooperate to ensure the effective functioning of the Commission,

Reiterating the need for the authorities of the Central African Republic to continue to take concrete steps to implement political, economic, social and security reforms as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 1998 (S/1998/148) and to fulfil the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic (S/1998/61, Annex) including continued cooperation with the international financial institutions,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURCA until 25 October 1998;

2. Calls upon the Government of the Central African Republic to adopt, as soon as possible, a plan for the effective restructuring of the armed forces of the Central African Republic based on the proposals submitted by the Commission on the Restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces;

3. Urges the international community to lend its support to the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African Republic, including the gendarmerie, through bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, and recognizes the role of MINURCA of providing advice and technical assistance for the initial steps in restructuring the security forces of the Central African Republic and, in this connection, coordinating and channelling international support to this end;

4. Recognizes that MINURCA, in implementing its mandate, may conduct limited-duration reconnaissance missions outside Bangui, and other tasks involving the security of United Nations personnel in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1159 (1998);

5. Calls upon the authorities of the Central African Republic to adopt rapidly an operational plan for the organization of the legislative elections, and so enable the United Nations and international organizations to make arrangements for the provision of the necessary assistance;

6. Encourages MINURCA to continue to consult with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) regarding the provision of advice and technical assistance to all relevant electoral bodies, and urges the Secretary-General to provide, as soon as possible, recommendations for United Nations assistance for the legislative election process·

7. Urges Member States to provide the required technical, financial and logistical assistance for the organization of free and fair elections;

8. Also urges Member States to support the efforts of the authorities of the Central African Republic in the economic and social development of the country and in particular encourages international financial institutions to cooperate with the Central African Republic in this regard;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council by 25 September 1998 on the implementation of the mandate of MINURCA, on developments in the Central African Republic, on progress towards the implementation of the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic and on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, including on commitments related to ensuring the country's economic recovery;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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S/1998/638
13 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of Chief Tom Ikimi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Chairman of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, which was held in Abidjan on 3 July 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-20402 (E) 150798 150798

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Annex

[Original: French]

Communiqué on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, issued in Abidjan on 3 July 1998 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Economic Community of West African States

1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in Abidjan on 3 July 1998 to consider the current situation in Guinea-Bissau.

2. They recalled that, at dawn on 7 June 1998, a rebellion was begun by certain elements of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau led by the former Chief of Staff, General Ansoumane Mane.

3. Following the violent clashes that took place between loyalist and rebel forces, President João Bernardo Vieira requested the current Chairman of ECOWAS to expand the spheres of activities and broaden the mandate of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to include Guinea-Bissau.

4. On receiving this request, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, His Excellency General Abdulsalami Abubakar, consulted with his peers and dispatched a fact-finding mission, headed by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, to the Gambia, Guinea and Senegal. The Chairman of the Conference subsequently decided to convene a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the present meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence.

5. The following member States were represented: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde and Mauritania were absent.

6. Representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and of the World Food Programme also participated in the meeting as guests. The Commander of the ECOMOG forces also took part in the meeting.

7. The Ministers reviewed the situation in Guinea-Bissau in the light of the accounts given by the Ministers of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Senegal and the Gambia and the Commander of the ECOMOG forces. They also considered the final report of the 18th meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held in Abidjan on 30 June and 1 July 1998.

8. The Ministers resolutely condemned the rebellion in Guinea-Bissau and warned the rebels not to commit any acts of atrocity against the civilian population and foreign nationals.

9. They appealed for an immediate cessation of hostilities throughout the country.

10. They reaffirmed their support for the democratically elected Government of President João Bernardo Vieira.

11. They agreed that the main objective of ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau was to restore peace and the authority of President Vieira s democratically elected Government throughout the country.

12. The Ministers agreed to work towards the achievement of that objective through a combination of three measures, namely:

(i) Dialogue and negotiations;

(ii) Imposition of sanctions and an embargo;

(iii) The use of force.

13. They recommended that the sphere of activities and mandate of ECOMOG should be broadened to include Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, all States members should supply additional troops to ECOMOG without delay. The Ministers also appealed to member States to provide ECOMOG with the necessary logistical support.

14. In order to ensure that these decisions and recommendations were implemented, the Ministers established a Committee of Seven, composed of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal, as well as representatives of the OAU and ECOWAS secretariats.

15. They instructed the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Seven on Guinea-Bissau to inform the current Chairman of ECOWAS of the results of their work.

16. The Ministers expressed their support for Guinea and Senegal s rapid intervention in Guinea-Bissau.

17. They expressed concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Guinea-Bissau and invited humanitarian agencies and all relevant institutions to ensure that the civilian population was not forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries because of famine and epidemics. They invited all agencies wishing to provide humanitarian assistance to Guinea-Bissau to contact the authorities of Guinea-Bissau and neighbouring countries in order to facilitate the dispatch of such assistance by land or by sea.

18. The Committee of Seven on Guinea-Bissau was instructed to seek the support of the United Nations Security Council for ECOWAS initiatives in Guinea-Bissau.

19. The Ministers also appealed to the international community to support the efforts of ECOWAS to restore peace and the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau.

20. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence expressed their profound gratitude to His Excellency Mr. Henri Konan Bedie, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, and to the Government and people of Côte d'Ivoire for their generous hospitality and the excellent facilities that were provided with a view to ensuring the success of their deliberations.